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Zaidel: Taxation of of De Facto Families

INEQUITY & ECONOMICS:
FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT
AND ESTATE TAX
TREATMENT OF
DE FACTO
FAMILIES
Michael Zaidel*
The last decade has seen two trends suggesting the decline
of the lifetime marital family unit: Both the divorce ratel and
the number of couples living outside of marriage are increasing.2
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law
1. As of March 1978, there were 90 divorced persons for every 1,000 married persons
living as husband and wife in the United States, a 157% increase over 1960 (35/1,000).
The ratio is higher for persons under 45 than for those over 45. Ratios for persons under
30 years increased by 296% between 1960 and 1978 (from 28/1,000 to 91/1,000) while the
increase for the 45-64 year-old age group was 83% (from 53/1,000 to 84/1,000) in that
period. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, SERIES P-20,
No. 338, at 2-3 (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as MARITAL STATUS].
The increasing divorce rate is no longer accompanied by a parallel trend in the rate
of remarriage. Since 1965, the ratio of divorces to first marriages has risen sharply while
the ratio of remarriages to divorces has begun to drop. In 1965 there were 20 divorces
and 150 remarriages for every 110 first marriages of women ages 14-44. By 1974 the
number of divorces had risen to 32 for every 99 first marriages; the number of remarriages declined to 164 for every 32 divorces. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF FEDERAL
STATISTICAL POLICY AND STANDARDS, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL INDICATORS 1976, at
66 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL INDICATORS].
2. The number of households with two unrelated adults of the opposite sex is increasing. In 1978, there were 1.1 million "unmarried couple" households, a 117% increase over 1970 when there were 523,000 such households. MARITAL STATUS, supra note
1, at 3. The author found no statistics on the number of homosexual family units in the
U.S. However, this Comment concerns all women who live in households headed by an
unmarried woman. In March 1978, there were 437,000 households consisting exclusively
of two females. MARITAL STATUS, supra note 1, at 42. An additional 8,037,000 fanillies
have a female householder with no husband present. ld. at 5. These figures include lodgers, partners, guests, and resident employees with no relatives in the household. ld. at 57.
Census Bureau demographers predict an increase in the number of non-family (nonhusband-wife) households. In 1978, 25% of all households were non-family households.
The Census Bureau projects that by 1995, 30% of all households will be non-family
households, accounting for 32-53 % of the total increase in households between 19781995. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, PROJECTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
847
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Choice of lifestyle has 'an obvious impact on the legal status of a
living arrangement. However, courts interested in protecting the
interests of parties to legitimate, serious (albeit unmarried) relationships are not necessarily limited to outdated notions of the
"meretricious"3 nature of a couple's living arrangement:' The
tax system should keep pace. Equal treatment of taxpayers in
similar situations and their abilities to pay are the proper concerns of a tax scheme. Alternative households are basically family situations; their limited duration appears less significant as
the divorce rate rises. Yet, when men and women seek alternative relationships-primarily as unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples-they face a federal tax program which refuses to recognize the de facto (if not de jure) family structure of
their household. IS
Disparate tax treatment of married couples in common law
AND FAMILIES: 1979 TO 1995, SERIES P-25, No. 805, at 2 (May 1979).
3. Historically, courts were reluctaot to graot relief to couples who chose to forego
marriage. They braoded such relationships meretricious, aod took the view that those
who live outside the law may not avail themselves of the law's aid in settling property
disputes arising from such living arraogements. Public policy considerations aod the
cleao haods doctrine were common rationales. The parties were left in their relative positions aod property belonged to the holder of the title-generally the mao. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979), rev'g 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d
454 (1978).
4. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) is the
leading case. Existing California case law ali'eady provided property rights for a cohabitaot who had ao express contract, where sex was not the express or entire consideration.
Vallera v. Valler'a, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943). See 1 CALIF. FAM. L. REP. 1002
(1977). Marvin expaoded the possibilities of implied contracts, implied agreements, aod
other tacit understaodings between the parties such as resultaot trust, constructive trust,
quaotum meruit, or other equitable remedies to protect the expectations of unmarried
couples. Marvin is said to have inspired at least 1,000 suits as well as a flurry of restrictive legislation. I. BAXTER, MARrrAL PROPERTY 11 (Supp. 1980). For cases aonotated according to the points stressed in Marvin, see id., at 94.
5. The Census Bureau defines a family as a group of two or more persons residing
together who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note
1, at 71. The common law concept of family is somewhat broader. See, e.g., Hartley v.
Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 77-78, 11 P .2d 616, 618 (1932) (a collective body of persons forming
one household under one head aod domestic government, having reciprocal, natural, or
moral duties to support or care for one aoother); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo.
App. 154, 158, 113 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1938) (a collective body of persons living together in .
one home, in a permaoent aod domestic character, under one head or maoagement). But
see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973), upholding on other grounds a
zoning ordinaoce which excluded from the definition of "family" three or more persons
"living aod cooking together as a single housekeeping unit [who are] not related by
blood, adoption, or marriage . . . ." [d. at 2.
Women's Law Forum
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vis-a-vis community property states led to remedial congressional action a generation ago. 6 The current inequity lies between married and unmarried couples. Correcting that imbalance will again require congressional action. Nevertheless, this
Comment argues that precedent exists for judicial remedy of
some of the inequitable tax burdens of the unmarried couple.
Tax planning is beyond the scope of this Comment, but suggestions will be offered. Property rights and contract formation are
treated only to the extent of their tax ramifications.'1
I. MARRIAGE UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The Internal Revenue Codes (Code) does not define marriage; it looks to state law for definitions of marriage, separation,
and divorce. 9 Although the Code treats each individual as a separate person for tax purposes,I° there are some significant tax
advantages (and disadvantages)l1 for married persons12 as hus6. See note 32 infra. See also I.R.C. §§ l(a), 2, 6013 (income splitting provisions);
2513 (gift splitting provision); 2056 (estate tax marital deduction); and 2523 (gift tax
marital deduction).
7. For discussions of property rights and contract formation by unmarried couples,
see generally I. BAXTER, note 4 supra; Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41
YALE L.J. 386 (1932); Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF.
L. REv. 937 (1977); Pfaff, Death Is Not the Great Equalizer: Division of Non-Marital
Property, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 157 (1980); Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for QuasiSpousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REv. 359 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Beyond Marvin];
Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couple: The Outlook After Marvin, 12 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 409 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Property Rights of a Same-Sex Couple]; 1 CALIF.
FAM. L. REP. 1002 (1977).
8. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
9. I.R.C. § 143 sets out criteria for the determination of marital status; it does not
define marriage. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally follows state law and recognizes common law marriages which are recognized by the state of the parties' residence. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. State characterizations are not,always determinative, however, particularly where those characterizations may result in uneven treatment
of taxpayers in different states. Id. Conflict between federal and state characterizations
arises most frequently over property settlements and alimony payments. See note 160
infra.
10. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAw STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE
LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 156 (2d ed. 1979).
11. For a discussion of the "marriage tax penalty," see note 32 infra.
12. Legal marriage in California is created by a formal ceremony solemnizing the
relationship. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970). This has been required since common
law marriage was formally abolished in California in 1895. Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at
939. Marital duties in California include mutual obligations of marital support, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5100 (West 1970), and child support, CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West Supp. 1981).
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bandI8 and wife l • which are not available to unmarried couples.
Unmarried opposite-sex couples have some acknowledged
property rights,I5 but the Code ignores the family nature of their
living arrangement and treats these couples as individual unmarried persons. The Code takes more notice of the marital contract than it does of the "family" nature of a marriage. I6 Unmarried opposite-sex couples who reject ceremonial marriageI7 at
least retain the option to elect it. Same-sex couples are denied
that choice. Is No state recognizes homosexual marriages-samesex couples who choose to achieve the equivalent must create
their own rights and duties by contract. IS
II. CONTRACTS IN LIEU OF MARRIAGE
Couples who plan to marry sometimes enter into antenuptial agreements,20 setting forth their respective property rights
13. Husband is a generic term with a definite and precise meaning identical with the
common or colloquial meaning. It signifies a man who has a wife. 41 C.J.S. Husband and
Wife § 2 (1944).
14. Wife defines a woman who has a husband and generally implies a lawful marriage.Id. § 3. However, gender classifications can be reassigned. See M.T. v. J.T., 140
N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976),
holding that a transsexual who through successful sex reassignment surgery harmonizes
her gender and genitalia so that she becomes physically and psychologically a woman is a
member of the female sex for marital purposes.
15. See materials cited note 7 supra.
16. For example, a husband and wife have a duty at common law to cohabit, 41
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 11 (1941); but not under the Code. It provides that married
persons may file income tax returns separately, recognizing that they may live apart.
1.R.C. § l(d).
17. There were 1,137,000 unmarried couple households in the United States in 1978.
MARITAL STATUS, supra note 1, at 3.
18. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (lesbian couple
not entitled to a marriage license because what they proposed was not a marriage); Baker
v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(marriage means state of union between persons of opposite sex).
19. At least one pre-Marvin case, Garcia v. Venega, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 368, 235
P.2d 89, 92 (1951), recognized the enforceability of property sharing agreements between
"any two persons (two women or two men, for example) .•.•" See generally Property
Rights of a Same-Sex Couple, supra note 7.
20. An antenuptial contract is a contract made before marriage or an agreement in
contemplation of marriage. Hewitt v. Gott, 132 Kan. 168, 294 P. 897 (1931). An antenuptial settlement is a contract or agreement before marriage, but in contemplation of and
generally in consideration of marriage. The main provision is that the property rights
and interests of either the prospective husband or wife or both of them, are determined
or property is secured to either or both of them, or their children. In re Carnevale's Will,
248 A.D. 62, 65, 289 N.Y.S. 185, 188 (1936). See generally 2 A. SINDEY, SEPARATION
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after marriage. Couples who choose to live outside marriage may
formulate contracts in lieu of marriage.21 Federal tax statutes in
this area primarily concern transfers of wealth by individuals,.so
policies favoring traditional marriage are not evident.
Generally, property transferred in exchange for the promise
of marriage is subject to gift tax,22 as is any transfer of property
without full consideration in money or money's worth.23 According to the Treasury Regulations, "[a] consideration not reducible
to a value in money or money's worth as love and affection,
promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the
entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount
of the gift. "2'
Although detriment to the donee is generally sufficient conAGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90 (1980).
21. See 2 A. SINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 100
(Supp. 1980); P. AsHLEY, OH PROMISE ME BUT PUT IT IN WRlTING (1978) (discussing
homosexual as well as heterosexual cohabitation).
22. The gift tax applies to a transfer by gift whether the property is real or personal,
tangible or intangible, and whether the transfer is direct or indirect. I.R.C. § 2511(a).
Transfers made for a valuable consideration in money or money's worth are not subject
to the tax. The gift tax is an excise tax on transfers of wealth. Bradford v. Commissioner,
34 T.C. 1059, 1063 (1960). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1958), further states the gift tax is
not imposed upon the receipt of the property by the donee, nor is it necessarily determined by the measure of enrichment resulting to the donee from the transfer, nor is it
conditioned upon ability to identify the donee at the time of the transfer. The tax is
measured by the value of the property passing from the donor. The gift tax is primarily
concerned with depletion of a taxpayer's estate through lifetime transfers of wealth.
The estate tax, a single assessment levied on the value of a person's e~tate, could be
defeated if inter vivos gifts went untaxed. Accordingly, the estate and gift taxes are construed together. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939); Estate of R.R. Glenn v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 323 (1966).
One of the basic changes of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90
Stat. 1521 (codified at I.R.C. § 2001(c», was to repeal the dual system of tax rates (the
of the estate rates) and replace it with a single unified rate schedule
gift tax had been
for use in computing both. Flanagan, Overview of Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 82 COM.
L.J. 220 (1977).
23. Transfers taxed as gifts are not confined to those lacking a valuable consideration according to the common law concept of gifts, but "embrace as well sales, exchanges,
and other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that the value of the
property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the
consideration given" in exchange. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). "Money's worth" requires more consideration than is necessary to support a contract. Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (Congress intended "gifts" in its broadest, most comprehensive sense with the evident desire to "hit all the protean arrangements which the
wit of man can devise that are not business transactions • • • .").
24. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1954).

*
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sideration to support a contract,25 it is inadequate to avoid gift
tax liability. For example, in Commissioner v. Wemyss,28 a
widow and her child received trust income from her former husband. The woman stood to forfeit her trust income upon remarriage. To offset her unwillingness to lose the income and induce
her to marry him, her fiance transferred stock worth $149,000 to
her. Affirming the Tax Court's holding that the transfer was a
taxable gift, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]o allow detriment
to the donee to satisfy the requirement of 'adequate and full
consideration' would violate the purpose of the statute and open
the door for evasion of the gift tax. "27
Under the same principle, any transfer of property as part
of a contract in lieu of marriage will result in a taxable gift.28
The gift is complete, hence taxable, when the donor so' parts
"with dominion or control as to leave. . . no power to change its
disposition . . . ."29 Beneficial use of the property must be
transferred; mere legal title is not enough. 30

. m.

INCOME SPLITTING POSSIBILITIES

Once a household is established, the inequities are clearer.
The most visible tax advantage of the married couple is the opportunity to file a single joint return. 31 Congress enacted the
joint return in 1948 to remedy the imbalance between commu25. Detriment to the promissee is generally adequate consideration, whether or not
any benefit accrues to the promisor. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 122 (1963).
26. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
27. Id. at 308. This case was decided the same day as Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945), which held that estate taxes and gift taxes are construed in pari materia. In
Wemyss, the Court reasoned the gift tax "aims to reach those transfers which are withdrawn from the donor's estate." 324 U.S. at 307.
28. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2502(d). If the donor does not pay the tax, the donee may be
required to discharge the liability to the extent of the value of the property received.
I.R.C. § 6324(b). For other potential tax consequences to the recipient, see discussion of
sexual services cases, notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text.
29. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
30. The gift tax is "applicable only to a transfer of a beneficial interest in property.
It is not applicable to a transfer of bare legal title to a trustee." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511l(g)(l) (1958).
31. IRC § 6013(a) states that: "[a] husband and wife may make a single return
jointly of their income taxes • • • even though one of the spouses had neither gross income nor deductions ••••" Husband and wife are taxed as if each were an unmarried
person who earned one-half their combined income. I.R.C. § l(a). The lower rates applicable to each half generally result in a lower combined tax.
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nity property and common law jurisdictions.82 Previously, married couples in common law states often attempted to achieve
the benefits of community property for tax purposes by assigning the rights to income to whichever spouse was in the
lower tax bracket-generally without success. De facto families
who attempt the tax savings of the joint return through private
income-splitting agreements will encounter the same resistance
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts, as did
their predecessors.
The general principle for married and unmarried families is
that income from personal services is taxable to the person who
earns it. Both the assignment of rights to future income from
services to be performed88 and the assignment of rights to in32. The Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 12, 53 Stat. 5 (now I.R.C. § l(a» introduced the joint
return to equalize the opportunities for income splitting in the common law states with
those of the eight community property jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington). M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at
193. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborne, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (state law controls). The advent of
the joint return made marital status important in federal income taxes for the first time
because income splitting reduced taxes, making it advantageous to be married. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 348 (4th ed. 1972); Mess,
For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 87, 104
(1978).
Because of the progressive nature of the tax schedule (the higher the income, the
higher rate at which increments are taxed) allowing a married couple to split the income
means the couple is effectively taxed at a lower rate than if all the income were attributable to the person who earned it. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91172, § 803,83 Stat. 487 (codified at I.R.C. § 1), the difference between single and married
couples' rates was as great as 42% at some income levels. When single persons complained that they were discriminated against for choosing to remain unmarried, the 1969
Act retained the married taxpayer as the basic unit and reduced the single taxpayer's
rate schedule. Now the rate structure discriminates against some married couples. If, for
example, one partner of the marriage produces all or most of the income, he or she pays
less tax than if single. If both spouses work, however, the second income is added to the
first and is thus placed in a higher marginal tax bracket than if it stood alone. For
couples filing jointly who earn comparable salaries, the higher tax bracket more than
offsets the lower rate schedule for joint returns-the so-called "marriage tax penalty."
See Mess, supra, at 96.
A married couple's scheme to avoid the "marriage penalty" failed when the Tax
Court decided their foreign year-end divorces, designed to give them the status of single
taxpayers, were invalid. Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980). The taxpayers relied on I.R.C. §§ 143(a), 6013(d)(1)(A), providing that marital status is determined at
year's end. IRS argued the divorces were sham transactions, relying on Rev. RuI. 76-255,
1976-2 C.B. 40. The court avoided that determination, ruling only that the foreign courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings, and that state law was
binding.
33. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of future earnings to spouse inef-
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come already earned but not yet receivedM are ineffective to divert the tax. The income is taxed back to the party who performs the services.
Income from property is treated differently. Obviously,
property can be given away and the future income will be
shifted to the donee. 35 Consequently, even the value of personal
services which went into creating property (a patent or copyright, for example) will nQt be taxed back to the source, provided that more than the bare right to collect income is transferred. For example, if A gives a bond coupon to B so that B
becomes the owner of the coupon and entitled to receive the income, but A retains the underlying bond, the income from the
coupon will be taxed to A.36 Here, A has retained too much control-in this case, the ability to determine future income flow
from the underlying property. A gift of the bond itself, on the
other hand, would permanently vest the income in the new
owner. 37
On this same principle, a fractional interest of the underlying property can be given away and a portion of the income
thereby shifted. 38 Thus, if one person purchases income-producing real estate, taking title jointly with another person, one-half
the income is taxable to each of the co-owners.39
fective to divert tax). Accord, Rev. Rul. 79-132, 1979-1 C.B. 62 (military chaplain under
vow of poverty is taxed on income he turns over to his religious order). But cf. Rev. Rul.
76-479, 1976-2 C.B. 20 (rule does not apply to payments received by agent on behalf of
principal and turned over to principal).
34. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (rights to renewal commissions previously earned but assigned to a family trust were taxable to the person who earned them).
35. For gift tax consequences, 8ee text accompanying notes 110-117 infra.
36. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (interest coupons detached and given to
son did not transfer the income to the son).
37. See id., at 115.
38. Hllim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959). In Heim, the taxpayer assigned
rights to his invention to a company, retaining the option to cancel. He then assigned
75% of that contract to his wife and two children. The court held the future income was
not taxable to him because more than collection rights were assigned-these were gifts of
income-producing property.
39. See Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976), appeal dismissed,
nolle pros.; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). For example, if A with her own funds
purchases property and has the title conveyed to herself and B as joint owners, with
rights of survivorship which may be defeated by either party severing her interest, there
is a completed gift of one-half the value of the property. [d.
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Joint bank accounts are treated differently than other forms
of jointly owned property.40 If only one person deposits funds in
an account from which either party may withdraw, all interest
income is includable in the income of the depositor!l No taxable
gift occurs so long as the contributor retains the power to take
possession of the entire contribution, even though the contributor may be a co-owner under state law!2 Only when the noncontributor withdraws funds does a completed gift occur, and then
only to the extent it exceeds his or her contribution!3 Therefore,
splitting interest income from savings accounts requires a partition unless the funds are so commingled that the sources are unascertainable. In that case, interest income is divided equally
among the co-owners!4

IV. INTERNAL ECONOMICS: INCOME AND GIFT TAXES

A.

SUPPORT AS INCOME TO THE HOUSEKEEPER

Day-to-day economic exchanges of money, property, and
services within the marital household go largely untaxed because
of policy decisions to exclude them from the tax base!15 They are
potentially taxable to members of the non-marital household.
The primary reason the value of support received by a housekeeping spouse is not included in his or her income is the marital support duty,46 although administrative convenience un40. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958); Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 C.B. 12.
41. Treas. Reg. § 2511-1(h)(4) (1958).
42. See id.; L. THOMAS, TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE
64 (2d ed. 1976).
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958). The $3,000 annual gift exclusion, provided
by I.R.C. § 2503(b), was intended to make it unnecessary to report small transfers. S.
REP. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 525.
44. Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976), appeal dismissed, nolle
pros.. In Finney, one-half of separated spouses' jointly held funds was taxable to each. It
was inlmaterial that the husband received no part because he nonetheless had an unrestricted right to it.
45. See notes 77-81 and accompanying text, infra.
46. At common law, the husband is legally obligated to support his wife and children. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 329 (1968). The wife has no corresponding
common law obligation. [d. § 334. In .California, the support obligation is mutual. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1970). Payments in discharge of this obligation are neither deductible by the payor nor, income or gift to the recipient. See Crittenden v. United
States, [52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 10,870 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
One commentator has criticized these marital duty classifications as possibly unconstitutional, overbroad generali2ations based on sex. Note, Estate Tax Section 2040:
Homemaker's Contribution to Jointly Owned Property, 29 TAX LAW 623, 629 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Homemaker's Contributions]. Thus, even if the common law recog-
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doubtedly plays its part. Thus, a housewife's allowance is
normally considered neither income47 nor gift48 to her; similarly,
a joint bank account used to defray household and living expenses is ordinarily not a gift!9
Unmarried household members have neither common law
nor statutory obligations to support one another. Exchanges of
money, property, or services within the de facto family raise
questions of income tax liability. 150 The Code specifically excludes gifts from gross income,151 but does not define "gift." The
Supreme Court has declined to formulate a definitive test. 152 The
determination of when a payment is to be treated as a gift, depends "ultimately on the application of the fact finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct [and]
the totality of the facts of each case."153 It has held (albeit in a
nizes the wife's duty to render domestic services, basing application of a federal statute
on such a gender-based classification may violate the fifth amendment. The Supreme
Court has held a statute which provides unequal treatment for men and women similarly
situated, where the difference in treatment bears no rational relationship to the purpose
of the statute, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The concept of a wife's duty
to provide domestic services to her husband is clearly a classification based on sex and
one arising from archaic and overbroad generalizations about gender-based roles. ld. at
629-30.
47. Burkhart v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 275, 278 (1928) (allowance as compensation for acting as housewife represented merely a personal expense to husband, not taxable income to wife).
48. SUpport is relative to the family's standard of living. Hill v. Commissioner, 88
F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937). One commentator would find a presumption of a gift for any
excess amount a wife accumulates if retained with the husband's consent. L. THOMAS,
supra note 42, at 88. If the allowance is a reasonable amount, it is doubtful Congress
intended it to be subject to gift tax. If the allowance were substantially increased for no
apparent reason, it would be a prima facie case for gift taxation.
49. See Crittenden v. United States, [52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,870 (E.D. Wis.
1952) (trust payments made to maintain taxpayer's home and to support and educate his
children did not exceed the actual expenses incurred and therefore were not taxable
gifts).
50. 1.R.C. § 61. Gross income includes income received in any form, be it money,
property, or services, and from whatever source derived. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957).
Similarly, payment of an obligation or liability on behalf of a third person is income to
that person. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
51. 1.R.C. § 102.
52. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 284-89 (1~60).
53. ld. at 289. While not determinative, the donor's intent is critical. ld. at 285-86.
With business associates, part of the examination of the total facts includes scrutinizing
how the donor treated the transation for his or her own tax purposes. A deduction
claimed for a bUsiness expense suggests it was not meant as a gratuity. This test is not
useful with most non-business-related expenditures because personal expenses are gener-
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commercial context) that a payment in return for services rendered or arising froin the "constraining force of any moral or
legal duty" is income to the recipient regardless of how the parties characterize the payment. IS' Courts have applied statutory
languagelSlS broadly in determining whether payments supporting
a nonfamily member should be taxed as income. In two leading
cases involving true meretricious relationships, the results were
inconsistent.
Margaret Brizendine was convicted of prostitution five
times before 1945.1S6 She met a man who promised to buy her a
house and support her if she gave up prostitution. She then married another man. The first kept his promise: He furnished a
$2,000 down payment for a house, arranged financing, provided
mortgage payments, and gave her at least an additional $25 per
week.1S7 The court held her promise to relinquish prostitution
and grant him companionship was sufficient consideration to
make the payments includable in her gross income.1S6
In contrast, a man provided Greta Starks a substantial
amount of cash and property, including a house, automobile,
and living expenses over a five-year period. 1S9 She claimed a
"very personal relationship"60 with the man and the court classified the payments as gifts.61 The Starks court relied on more
than testimony as to the warmth of the relationship-it looked
also to the fact that the woman received $41,000 in 1955 and
only $5,000 or $6,000 in other years.62 The payments to Brizenally not deductible. I.R.C. § 262 (no deduction for personal, living, or family expenses).
54. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citing Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937».
55. I.R.C. § 61 (gross income includes income received in any form, from any
source).
56. Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 149 (1957).
57. Id. at 150.
58. Id. at 151.
59. Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 676 (1966).
60. Id. at 677.
61. The Tax Court found it noteworthy that the government's attorney failed to ask
the man involved whether he considered the payments gifts. Two writers view this concern with the donor's motive as reflecting "the importance of the human element in the
taxing process." R. SOMMERFELD & G. STREULING, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, TAX RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 32 (1976). While this seems a flimsy basis
on which to distinguish the cases, it suggests the importance of the donor's intent under .
the general guidelines of Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
62. Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) at 677.
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dine were more uniform in amount and regularity, but Brizendine's record as a prostitute, and her husband's avocation as a
gambler, suggested the presence of unreported, illegal income.
Because the IRS had reconstructed Brizendine's income based
on known expenditures,S3 the Tax Court did little more than
recognize the obvious: She and her husband had significantly
underreported their income. The "agreement" merely furnished
a ready rationalization to sustain the agency's findings. 64
Some courts view meals, lodging, and other support received
by a de facto family homemaker as compensation for services
rendered rather than as support,S5 even though basic contract
law generally does not view a housekeeper's services as an exchange for compensation.ss Income is taxable in whatever form
received, including cash, property, and the free use of property.S?
The value of support received appears to fall within the definition of gross income. Two cases seem to support this
proposition.
For example, W.T. Hamilton felt obligated, but was incapable of caring for his 81-year old mother.ss He arranged for an old
family friend in need of a home to care for his mother and perform light housekeeping chores. Hamilton provided the housekeeper a place to live and paid her cash to care for his mother.
63. She filed no income tax returns for the taxable years ending 1945-1949. Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) at 149.
64. See R. SOMMERFELD & G. STREULING, supra note 61, at 31.
65. See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
66. Many of the early cases on compensation for services rendered in the household
are claims against the estate. Generally, there was no expectation of wages. Rather,
plaintiff often hoped for and was encouraged to expect a legacy. Havighurst, supra note
7, at 392. See generally sources cited note 7 supra.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1{a) (1957) explains that income may be realized in the form
of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property as well as in cash. Most
cases dealing with tax treatment of free lodging have involved the employer-employee
relationship. Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1949), aff'd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d
Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of a house owned by a corporation wholly controlled by the
taxpayer was given not as a gratuity but as compensation for services rendered and was
properly includable in income); Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947), appeal dismissed, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951); Roberts v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 599
(1948). But see Richards v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1941) (absent evidence
that the rental value was compensation for services, it was a gift from the corporation to
its stockholders, not taxable income); Peacock v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.
1958), rev'g 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1252 (1956).
68. Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960).
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The Tax Court determined that the payment of essential living
expenses was compensation for services.6801
D.L. Angstadt met and began dating an acquaintance.69
Both were employed, but he suggested that if she served as a
housekeeper and generally cared for their day-to-day needs, she
and her daughter could live with him. Angstadt, in return, offered to furnish food, shelter, and all their living needs. The parties understood that they were not entering into a common law
marriage and that neither was obligated to continue the arrangement.'70 Again, the Tax Court held that, because the arrangements were economically beneficial to the parties, payment of
essential living expenses was compensation for services rendered. '71 Both cases arose in the context of a claimed personal
exemption for the housekeeper, not on whether any support received was taxable income. The pronouncements on compensation justified disallowing the claimed dependency exemption;'72
they are dictum on the issue of income tax liability for the value
of support received. '73
B.

THE VALUE OF HOUSEKEEPER'S SERVICES AS INCOME TO THE
HOUSEHOLDER

Domestic services have value.'74 A housewife's services to her
68.1. 34 T.C. at 929.
69. Angstadt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M, (CCH) 693 (1964).
70. ld. at 693.
71. ld. at 695. Accord, Massey v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931) (single
man maintained a home for his mother and sister; contributions to the sister's support
were in return for the performance of duties as a housekeeper).
72. For a discussion of dependency exemptions for household members see § V
infra.
73. Both Hamilton and Angstadt involved the individual income tax returns of the
primary householders. The courts did not discuss whether the housekeepers included in
income on their own returns the value of support received.
74. The Social Security Administration fixed the annual value at $4,705 in 1972.
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NOTE No.9, EcoNOMIC VALUE OF A HOUSEWIFE (DHEW Pub. No. 75-11701)(1975), noted in Bruch, supra
note 7, at 113. One commentator placed that value at $13,364. Galbraith, A New Economic Role for Women?, 155 CURRENT 41 (1973). The total value of homemakers' services has been calculated to be roughly one-fourth the Gross National Product. ld.
One commentator states that the most significant contribution the women's movement has made to the problem of economic justice at divorce is calling attention to the
value of homemaker's services. As of 1979, 22 states had by statute or court decision
authorized divorce courts to consider the homemaker's contribution in determining property distribution or setting the amount of alimony or separate maintenance. I. BAXTER,
supra note 4, at 8. Along with this recognition has developed an accompanying trend
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family are a major source of imputed income,'1G ~ven though
these services go untaxed. They are considered imputed income,
and not an exchange of labor because of a tacit recognition by
the Treasury that the services are self-generated and totally consumed within the family.'16 The IRS has never attempted to
draw imputed income from domestic services into the tax base,'1'1
probably because of a lack of authority in the Code for taxing
imputed income,'18 doubts of its constitutionality,'19 a concern
toward decreasing the amount and duration of alimony so that, on balance, the egalitarian principles of the women's movement have been used to remove prior advantages
without compensating advances. Id. at 9. See generally Comment, Equity and Economics: A Case for Spousal Support, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 443 (1979).
With nonmarital partners, an implied agreement may lead to the presumption the
services were rendered gratuitously, particularly in states other than California. See, e.g.,
York v. Place, 273 Or. 947,949,544 P.2d 572, 574 (1975) (presumption that the services
were rendered as a gratuity extended to nonmarital partners because their domestic
union was essentially a family relationship).
I.R.C. § 2040(c), added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511, 92
Stat. 2881, recognizes the value of services contributed by a surviving spouse and joint
owner of property, provided the property is used in a business or farm in which she or he
materially participated. The surviving spouse's participation affects the extent to which
jointly owned property is taxed in the decedent's estate. Even this recognition ignores
services in the home.
75. Imputed income is defined as a "flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned
and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf." Note, The Constitutionality of the Taxation of
Imputed Income, 9 VAL. L. REV. 221, 221 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Taxing Imputed
Income] (citing Marsh, Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514, 514 (1943».
For example, if a housekeeper hires someone to prepare meals, clean, and perform
domestic services she will have to work to produce additional income (which will be
taxed) to pay the other person. But if she stays home and does her own work, no taxable
income is generated even though the net benefit to the family is the same. B. BITTKER &
L. STONE, supra note 32, at 64.
76. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21.
77. Id. A 1947 Treasury study determined that, because of the housewife's substantial contributions, a married couple does not need twice the money income of a single
person to maintain the same standard of living. Comparison of the standard deductions
(now Zero Bracket Amounts) allowed single persons and married couples in subsequent
years suggests that the housewife's contribution is actually indirectly taxed through a
relatively lower standard deduction. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 32, at 356. In a
commercial context, the IRS has taxed what verges on imputed income. See Commissioner v. Minzer, 279 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1960) (commissions received by a life insurance
broker on policies upon his own life are income to the broker); Commissioner v. Daehler,
281 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1960). In Daehler a real estate salesman purchased for himself real
estate listed with a second broker who split the commission with the first broker's employer. The employer gave his portion of the commission to the employee. The court
held the amount was compensation for services and not a discount in sale price.
78. M. CHlRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21.
79. [d. See also Taxing Imputed Income, supra note 75.
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over valuation,so and a sense that the concept is vague and theoretical to the general public. SI Enforcing such provisions under
our self-reporting income tax system could prove an administrative nightmare,s2 although there are no guarantees the IRS will
never attempt to or cannot tax such services.ss
Treasury regulations argue that the value of domestic services performed by the de facto family housekeeper are income
to the beneficiary,S' but there is no case law taxing as income the
value of these services.s5 Valuation poses a problem. The value
of services might readily be determined in the case of barter
clubs86 where all members are professionals exchanging professional services. 87 It is far more difficult to accurately value the de
facto housekeeper's domestic services because of the presence of
an element of gift in those services. Like the marital unit, the de
facto family's services are imputed income to that living unit.
80. In most cases the real value is less than the fair market value of services because
the individual might choose to do without the service if he or she had to pay for it. M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21.
81. ld.
82. The American income tax system relies heavily on wage withholding to collect
most of the personal income tax. See E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, supra note 75, at 115.
Wage withholding was enacted because most taxpayers are unable to save enough money
to pay their taxes in one installment at year's end. The United States government's reliance on a self-executing system to assess and collect most income tax further argues
against taxing imputed income. ld.
83. It would probably take specific congressional action to do so. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 20.
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1957) (if services are paid for in exchange for
other services, the ·fair market value of such other services taken in payment must be
included in income as compensation).
85. The Tax Court has found an implied agreement that the value of the housekeeper's services equals the value of food, lodging, and other support. See, e.g., Massey v.
Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931); Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960);
Provita v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (1970); Angstadt v. Commissioner, 27
T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1968). This reasoning has been used to deny the householder a personal exemption for the housekeeper, not to tax the services as income to the householder. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
86. More than $13 billion in goods and services are bartered annually in the United
States. Mutual Credit Buying Systems, Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., transacts $1 million
annually among its 3,500 members. Useful Exchange in Reston, Va., offers a communitywide pool of 100 personal services exchanged on an hour-for-hour basis. C. STAPLETON &
P. RICHMAN, BARTER: How TO GET ALMosT ANYTHING WITHOUT MONEY 37-40 (1978).
87. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, offers this example: "In return for personal legal
services by a lawyer for a housepainter, the housepainter painted the lawyer's [home].
Both the lawyer and the housepainter are members of a barter club•••• All the members of the club are professional or trades persons." Both must include in income the fair
market value of services received.
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Because they are not part of an arm's length, bargained for exchange of labor, as envisioned in the statutory definition of gross
income,88 the value of such services does not belong in the tax
base. De facto families, like their married counterparts, view
housekeeping services as an obligation of ordinary family life,
not as a wage earning position.89
There are some additional arguments for excluding from the
income of the homemaker the value of support received, even if
it appears to fit within the tax base. The Code excludes from
income the value of "meals and lodging furnished on the premises for the convenience of the employer."9o Meals and lodging
are excludable when received by a live-in maid.91 This reasoning
can be extended to both the housewife and the de facto family
housekeeper. Alternately, the situation can be viewed as simply
a sharing of personal expenses. There is some authority for this
view because reimbursements for car pooling are not income.92
Under this theory, the income producing partner pays the
housekeeper's share of personal living expenses and is reimbursed through services.
C.

RECIPROCAL GIFTS AND THE GIFT

TAX

Household services rendered by an unmarried cohabitant
have traditionally been considered gifts under contract law.98
Household services are not subject to gift tax. 94 Free lodging
might be, because the permissive use of property involves the
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61 (1957).
89. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 162-63.
90. I.R.C. § ll9(a) states that the value of meals and lodging furnished to an employee, the employee's spouse, or dependents is excluded from the gross income of the
employee, provided the meals are furnished on the premises and acceptance of the lodging on the business premises is a condition of employment. The exclusion is a tacit recognition that in-kind payments are worth considerably less than retail or fair market value.
See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 18; Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838
(1937).
91. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.ll9-1(c) (1956) the term "business premises of the
employer" generally means the place where the employee is employed. Consequently,
meals and lodging furnished in the employer's home to a domestic servant are treated as
meals and lodging furnished on the business premises of the employer.
92. Rev. Rul. 55-555, 1955-2 C.B. 20.
93. Beyond Marvin, supra note 7, at 384.
94. The gift tax is imposed only on "the transfer of property." I.R.C. § 2501. No tax
is payable on donated services. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 111.03[2] (4th ed. 1978).
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transfer of a property right. However, given the gift tax concern
with depletion of a taxpayer's estate through inter vivos transfers, sharing property cannot be said to diminish a taxpayer's
accumulated wealth within the purpose of that law.
There is little case law on the gift tax liability of shared
property. Rent-free lod~ng is similar to the use of interest-free
loans and may be profitably compared. The courts have uniformly rejected attempts by the IRS to tax such 10ans,915 a refusal predicated in part on the absence of any realization of cash
income and in part on the freedom not to make a profit.96
There is a distinction, after all, between (1) permitting a
friend to share your residence, and either (2) paying that person's rent elsewhere, or (3) making a gift of money with which to
rent or purchase housing.97 The distinction rests on the completeness of the gift.98 Because control and dominion have not
passed in the case of mere permissive use, no gift has been
made. 99. The gift tax is concerned with depletion of an estate
95. E.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). In Crown, the taxpayer was a one-third partner in Areljay
Co.• Areljay made approximately $18,000,000 in non-interest-bearing and demand notes
on open account to 24 trusts established for various relatives. The court followed Johnson, which held that because the loan principal remains in the lender's estate at death,
nothing about the transfers permitted the lender to .avoid future estate tax by reducing
the current estate via inter vivos gifts of principal. 67 T.C. at 1063. The IRS, however,
refuses to follow Johnson. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
96. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 1063.
97. That distinction-the sharing of property among relatives or family members-was discussed in Crown:
[T]here are policy considerations which militate against
viewing the value use of money or property as a taxable event
for gift tax purposes ••.• [The IRS position] could be extended to a multitude of situations involving gratuitous use or
sharing of real or personal property among relatives. The application of the gift tax to common intra-family sharing or use
of property seems administratively unmanageable and such
situations point up the difficulty with the concept of gift taxation attaching to mere permissive use.
67 T.C. at 1065.
98. "As to any property, or part thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has
so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or the benefit of another, the gift is complete." Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958) (emphasis added). Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
99. Free use of real estate may be taxable when the donee has exclusive use of it,
but the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, does not apply to either the shar-
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through lifetime transfers.loo Logically, then, all transfer-forconsumption exchanges as well as the shared use of property
should be exempt from gift tax, provided the transfers do not
result in the donee acquiring power of disposition over property
of significant value. 10l
D.

INCOME TAX AND GIFT TAX LIABILITY UNDER SHARE
PENSES AGREEMENTS

Ex-

Often, both partners in the de facto family have outside income. For the family that rents its living quarters, the tax treatment of contributions to rent are quite simple. The parties are
merely splitting personal rental expenses under the rationale of
the car pooling doctrine. l02 If one of them owns the real estate,
however, cash contributions by the nontitle holder may be rental
incomelOS unless a gift can be shown.104 The presence of an income pooling or expense sharing agreement undercuts anyargument that the money is intended as a gift.
Nothing is gained by treating the arrangement as a rental
transaction. Rental hlcome can be offset by income-related expenses,l°5 but the largest of these (state and local property
taxes,108 and mortgage interestl07) are already deductible by
every property owner. When a transaction is not profit motiing of property or to services because neither constitutes a transfer of property.
100. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308
(1945). Some courts hold that protection of the income tax is another purpose of the gift
tax. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d at 235 n.2. See IRS Letter Ruling 7921017 (Feb.
16, 1979) (transfer taxed as both income and a gift).
101. See ALI ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GIFT
TAX PROJECT]. The American Law Institute proposal exempts transfers for the benefit of
any person residing in the transferor's household, so long as the expenditure does not
provide the donee with property that will retain significant value after one year from the
date of expenditure. ld. at 19.
102. Rev. Rul. 55-555, 1955-2 C.B. 20. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
103. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8 (1957) (gross income includes rents received from the occupancy of real estate).
104. I.R.C. § 102(a) states the general rule that gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift.
105. I.R.C. § 162(a). Depreciation (I.R.C. § 167(a)(2» is a mandatory deduction for
income producing property. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(a) (1956). Failure to take the
proper deduction attributable to income in the taxable years it is allowed does not preclude a later accounting for that depreciation deduction, and an increase in taxable gain
when the property is sold.
106. I.R.C. § 164(a).
107. I.R.C. § 163(a).
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vated, deductions may not exceed income and a loss may not be
shown for tax purposes. lOB If the parties' agreement sets a value
on the lodging which is less than the fair market rental value of
the housing, the transaction may be scrutinized as not profit
motivated. lo9
One response to the problem of unintended taxable income
is joint ownership, where contributions by both parties go to
their respective equities in the property. Placing property in
joint ownership, however, is irrevocable. It can also give rise to
gift tax liability.
The undivided interest and survivorship features of joint
tenancyllO may make this form of co-ownership attractive to de
facto families who seek to emulate either marital joint tenancy
or community property. However, creating any form of co-ownership where the interests of the contenants do not correspond
with actual contributions results in a taxable gift.lll If title is
conveyed, a gift has been made. 1l2 The fact that the donor re108. I.R.C. § 183(b)(2).
109. The IRS view is valid where separate quarters (a fiat, separate apartment, or
distinct housing unit) are involved. It is generally inapposite where the parties share the
same living space, because of the difficulty in valuing permissive use. A separate housing
unit which is not offered at a bargain rate to a relative or friend would be available to
the public at its fair market value; the personal quarters of the householder normally
would not.
110. For the estate tax consequences of a gift of property in joint tenancy, see notes
193-197 and accompanying text, infra.
111. For example, A purchases real property with personal funds and has title conveyed to himself or herself and another party B as joint owners, with rights of survivorship which may be defeated by either party severing his or her interest. A has made a
gift of half the value of the property to B. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958).
The exact form a cotenancy takes is governed by local law. Generally, property acquired by cohabitants belongs to the holder of legal title. Common law emphasizes fortuitous or calculated taking of title so that even if the parties previously entered into a 5050 agreement, some courts impose a tenancy in common. See generally I. BAXTER, supra
note 7, at 560-76 and cases therein.
112. There are several important statutory provisions which limit the taxation of
marital intra-family transfers of wealth which are not available to de .facto families. The
most significant allows one-half the value of a gift between spouses to escape tax. !.R.C.
§ 2523. The splitting provision equalizes gift tax treatment between community property
and common law states. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 1111.03.
The second relates to purchase of a home. Despite the general rule on taxation of
disproportionate interests, creation of a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy in real
property between husband and wife is not considered a gift unless the owner intends a
gift. I.R.C. § 2515. Why any donor would choose to treat a transfer as a taxable gift when
not necessary is answered partly by the difference in gift tax treatment of the termina-
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tains the ability to receive all the property upon the death of the
donee does not preclude a taxable gift.11s
In general, when two persons assume a mortgage upon
which both are individually liable, each is a purchaser to the extent of one-half the debt assumed. If one cotenant contributes
disproportionately toward the purchase price, however, the excess contribution is a taxable gift.11• Subsequent unequal contributions are also gifts in the year made.H 5
Payments on a residential mortgage in the early years go
mostly to interest. If both parties are jointly and severally liable,
payments on behalf of the non-contributor are neither income
nor gift;116 only the portion of the mortgage payment applied toward the donee's share of the principal is a taxable gift. So long
as principal payments remain under $6,000 annually, gift tax can
be avoided. 117
A revocable trust,118 on the other hand, would both retain
tions of cotenancies involving jointly held marital real property. That, in turn, depends
on whether the property was previously subject to gift tax. For a discussion of the tax
consequences of non-election, see H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF EsTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 352-59 (3d ed. 1980). The election covers subsequent improvements and other additions in value to the property, such as mortgage payments. See
I.R.C. § 2515(c)(2).
113. See note 111 supra.
114. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11 10.05[1].
115. Examples are mortgage payments and capital improvements. See id.
116. Nicodemus v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 25 (1932) (despite the general rule on
apportionment according to interests, when parties share a joint and several obligation,
the deduction for real estate taxes and interest is allowed to the party who makes the
payment out of his or her separate funds). Accord, Blackburn v. Commissioner, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 1048 (1978); Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976).
117. With two joint tenants, only half the principal amount constitutes a gift; $3,000
faIls within the annual exclusion. I.R.C. § 2503(b). When the property is later sold, income tax rules take effect. In computing gain for income tax purposes, the basis of a
donee's interest at the time of sale is the same as it would have been in the hands of the
donor. For purposes of computing a loss, it is the lesser of the donor's basis or the fair
market value at the time of the gift. I.R.C. §1015(a). In either case, the basis is increased
by the amount of the gift tax paid, but not to exceed the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. I.R.C. § 1015(d). For gifts made after 1976, only that portion
of the gift tax paid which is attributable to the appreciation in value of the property
while in the hands of the donor may be added. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6).
118. The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent he or she reserves
such a power. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959). Historically, property
transferred in trust to a person in consideration of an agreement to cohabit illegally with
the settlor was invalid as against public policy. ld. § 64. Cohabitation is no longer illegal
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title and avoid gift tax. U9 An agreement allocating payments by
the non-title holder to that person's interest in the property
would seem to preclude having to treat those payments as rent.
Alternatively, the IRS might argue that periodic contributions
received by the title holder are gain from the sale of the property on an installment basis. This also would not be true under
an express or even an implied trust theory. And in California at
least, prior or contemporaneous payment is not a prerequisite to
a resulting trust, so that an implied trust can arise even when
payments are made after the conveyance.120
Intrafamily exchanges are generally marked by a sense of
personal obligation and donative intent. Where sharing of property is involved-even when there is a reciprocal exchange of
services-the situation lacks the free exchange and self-interest
characteristic of the open market, arm's length transaction. Because support concerns personal living expenses rather than accretions in wealth, in the absence of a clear profit motive, all
intrafamily exchanges of services, transfers for consumption, and
sharing of property should be exempted from income, gift, and
estate taxes. 121

v.

PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS

A married taxpayer who files a separate income tax return is
entitled to a dependency exemption for his or her spouse.122 An
exemption is also provided for both the taxpayer and spouse on
a joint return. 123 There is no exemption for a common law
spouse if the state of their domicile does not recognize common
law marriage. 12'
in California. See generally materials cited notes 3 & 4 supra.
119. See note 98 supra. See also R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note
94, at n 10.01[5].
.
120. Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal. 2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945); Stone v. Lobsien, 112 Cal.
App. 2d 750, 247 P.2d 357 (1952). In Stone, circumstances showed an implied promise to
make the installment payments. That was sufficient to find a resulting trust. ld. at 756,
247 P.2d at 360.
121. See GIFT TAX PROJECT, supra note 101, at 19.
122. I.R.C. § 151(b) allows an exemption of $1,000 for the taxpayer. An additional
exemption of $1,000 is allowed for the taxpayer's spouse if the taxpayer does not file a
joint return and the spouse has no gross income and is not the dependent of another
taxpayer. .
123. I.R.C. § 6013 allows a married couple to file a single joint return.
124. lR.C. § 152(b)(5). H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1957), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 811, 817-18. Accord, Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
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The Code does allow an exemption for an "individual . . .
who . . . has as his principal place of abode the home of the
taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household. "1211 There
are, however, three major obstacles to gaining a dependencyexemption for a de facto family member under this definition: (1)
the dependent's gross income must be less than $1,000;128 (2) the
relationship may be held in violation of locallaw;127 and (3) the
relationship may be characterized by the courts as an exchange
of services, not support.128
In the leading case, Turnipseed v. Commissioner,129 the taxpayer violated the criminal laws of Alabama130 by living with a
woman who was married to another man. Turnipseed claimed
her as a dependent. The Tax Court was unable to find any legislative guidance, but reasoned that "Congress never intended the
specific paragraph in question [Code section 152(a)(9)] to be
construed so literally as to permit a dependency exemption for
an individual whom the taxpayer is maintaining in an illicit relationship in conscious violation of the criminal laws of the jurisdiction of his abode. "131 The House Report to the Technical
Amendments Act of 1958132 confirmed the holding in Turnipseed that persons in an illicit relationship cannot constitute a
household.133 That report was issued in 1957 when nonmarital
cohabitation was generally illegal/ 34 but it still shapes the
177 (1978), appeal dismissed nolle pros. by taxpayer.
125. I.R.C. § 151(e) allows a $1,000 exemption for each dependent as defined in
I.R.C. § 152.
126. I.R.C. § 151(e)(1)(A).
127. See text accompanying notes 129-133 infra.
128. See text accompanying notes 135-143 infra.
129. 27 T.C. 758 (1957).
130. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1940) (currently at § 13-8-1 (1975».
131. 27 T.C. at 760.
132. Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 4, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958) (codified at I.R.C. § 152(b)(5».
133. H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1957) reprinted in 1958-3 C.B.
811, 817-18.
134. Bruch, supra note 7, at 132 n.115. California has since repealed criminal sanctions for sexual activity between consenting adults. 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 71, §§ 5-12.
Compare California's neutral standard formulated in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,
557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (mores have changed so radically that a standard
based on moral considerations cannot be imposed) with Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty.,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (citing biblical quotes
in upholding a Virginia sodomy statute).
The possible unconstitutionality of such statutes may not be used to attack I.R.C. §
152(b)(5). Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'g 36 T.C.M. 934
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courts' thinking. Even if a state has no statute proscribing a particular living arrangement, the court can refuse to allow the exemption on the grounds that meals, lodging, and other amenities
furnished a cohabitant are remuneration for services, not
support.131S
In Bombarger v. Commissioner,136 the taxpayer and her son
moved in with Winnie Stewart and her husband. The
Bombargers remained after Stewart's husband died. Bombarger
had an outside job, Stewart did the housework; the women considered themselves "just like mother and daughter."13'1 Because
she viewed herself as having furnished the support of the household, Bombarger requested a finding that Stewart resided in her
"home" for purposes of the dependency exemption,138 but was
denied the exemption because Stewart owned the house. 13D The
court found other grounds as well on which to deny the exemption: "These parties are mutually dependent upon one another.
Each contributes something the other needs and each receives a
benefit from a mutually satisfactory arrangement. "140 The determination of mutual dependency was dictum. Furthermore, the
court ignored the fundamental principle that the law should tax
those who are best able to pay. When applied consistently to
cases of mutual dependency between de facto spouses, that principle supports a personal exemption for a non-wage earning
housekeeper.

An example of the Tax Court's undue emphasis on the element of gift involved in support is Hamilton v. Commissioner. 141
In Hamilton, the Tax Court analyzed a similar situation under
(CCH) (1977) (the Commissioner cannot be required to determine the constitutionality
of such a law). Contra, In re M.M. Shackelford, 45 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d (P-H) 11 80-529
(D.C. Mo. 1980) (dictum) (Missouri statute prescribing criminal sanctions for unmarried
cohabitation was unconstitutional).
135. See Massey v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931); Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960); Provita v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (1970); Angstadt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1968).
136. 31 T.C. 473 (1957).
137. ld. at 474.
138. I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) includes in the definition of a dependent "an individual. . •
who for the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home of
the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household."
139. 31 T.C. at 475.
140. ld. at 476.
141. 34 T.C. 927 (1960).
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the history of the household member exemption and decided
that Code section 152(a)(9) was intended for foster children, not
unmarried adult housekeepers. 142 Explaining the nature of
support, the court said that, in the case of foster children, "support would be gratuitous and given to the recipient from motives
of charity, affection, or moral obligation without thought of receiving in return a quid pro quO. m43
The court did not face the realities of foster care. Whatever
the foster parents' motive in caring for foster children, they do
receive an inducement in the form of foster care payments.144
The dependency exemption is simply one more incentive to encourage foster care. The family with foster children is in fact a
de facto family, one sanctioned by both Congress145 and the
states. 146 The Tax Court itself already allows exemptions for a
cohabitant's children/4 '1 not because of the absence of any "quid
142. Id. at 929.
143. Id.
144. In California, monthly rates for foster care are set by the county and (as of
1972) vary from $72 to $160. R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 521 n.36 (1978).
Most foster parents are middle to lower middle class and over age 40. Id. at 521. There
are an estimated 243,600 children in foster homes. Id. at 514 n.2.
145. The federal government, under the Social Security Act, reimburses states for a
portion of foster care costs for children meeting financial eligibility requirements. 42
U.S.C. § 608(a) (1976).
146. In California, the state is primarily concerned with financing foster care although it is also concerned with supervising and licensing the program. See CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §§ 16510-16511 (West 1980); 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 6, §§ 85015-85175
(1980).
147. See Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177 (1978), appeal dismissed,
nolle pros. by taxpayer (exemption allowed for cohabitant's child, but not for cohabitant). Illanovsky v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 225, 226 (1965) (dictum) (marital
status of the couple does not affect their right to claim children as dependents). In distinguishing Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758 (1957), Estate of Daniel Buckley v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 664 (1962) and Unterman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 93 (1963), the
Illanovsky court stated in dictum:
In each of these cases the taxpayer was not entitled to an exemption for the woman with whom he lived because their relationship violated local law. But none of these cases concern
children living with the taxpayer. Even if we assume that the
..• [couple was] not legally married, that alone would not affect their right to claim the children as dependents.
Id. at 226. See also Rev. Rul. 54-498, 1954-2 C.B. 107 (exemption allowed for illegitimate
child).
Where more than one person provides support for the children in the household,
there may be some proof problems in establishing the precise amounts contributed.
There is some case authority that a person who supplies more than half the aggregate
support for a group of persons has supplied more than half for each of them, and that
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pro quo," but more likely due to the children's ignorance of parental lifestyle. Denying personal exemptions to de facto spouses
on the grounds that the relationship is "illicit," or that support
and services are bargained for compensation, is anachronistic.
An encouraging sign is In re M.M. Shackelford,148 a recent
bankruptcy case. In Shackelford, the taxpayer was a single woman who lived with her three children and a single man. Their
living arrangement violated a Missouri statute that made any
open and notorious adulterous situation or lewd cohabitation a
misdemeanor. The IRS denied the exemption for the man. The
bankruptcy court allowed the exemption and held the living arrangement lawful based on a modern reading of state statute,
legislative history, and existing case law. 149 The court noted that
although, in the past, the mere act of living together was construed as lewd and lascivious behavior, it was not so today.lIIO
One case does not necessarily herald a trend, but the decision
does significantly expand the parameters of qualified dependents, and may open the courts to further challenges of the
strict IRS view.
the cost of maintaining the household generally inures equally to each dependent. Fisher
v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1144 (1951); Dunn v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 11 63,189
(1963).
Alternatively, when two or more persons each furnish more than 10% of the child's
support, together they provide at least 50%, and none individually furnishes more than
50% of each child's support, they may sign a "multiple support agreement." I.R.C. §
152(c). Under this arrangement, anyone of the supporters (the highest income partner,
for example) may claim all the exemptions, thereby reducing that person's marginal tax
rate, and lessening the overall household tax bill.
148. 45 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d

(P~H)

11 80-529 (D.C. Mo. 1980).

149. The court explained:
It is not for this Court to say that two unmarried persons living together is a step ahead or behind two unmm:rieds holding
themselves out as husband and wife. • • • It is not within the
jurisdiction of this Court to establish a code of morals for
taxpayers.
[d. at 80-1076.

150.

If one goes far enough back in case law, perhaps such conduct

[unmarried cohabitation] could be said to be in violation of
• • • state law . • • • [B]ut in this day and age, can it be said
that merely living together is open, gross lewdness or lascivious behavior? Does this conduct openly outrage decency? Is it
injurious to public morals? • . • I think not.
[d. (Barker, C.J.).
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VI. DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY: GIFT AND INCOME
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A.

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS

During marriage, payments to support a spouse or children
are not taxable income to the recipient, and generally do not
comprise taxable gifts. llll Voluntary payments made. after the
dissolution of a marriage similarly remain outside the ambit of
the income tax. 11l2 The Code does, however, tax as income certain mandatory spousal support payments incident to dissolution of a marriage. IllS
Dissolution of a de facto family may be accompanied by
similar separate maintenance payments.1M De facto family members have no reasonable expectations of support based on status,
but they can create their own support rights and duties through
151. Burkhart v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928); Crittenden v. United States,
[52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1110,870 (E.D. Wis. 1952). Support is relative to the family's
station in life. For a discussion of some thorny problems which can arise in determining
the extent or value of this support obligation, see R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND,
supra note 94, at II 10.02[5][a].
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.75-1(b) (1957).
153. The major sections governing these separate maintenance payments are I.R.C.
§§ 61(a)(8), 71 (inclusion in gross income of amounts received); 215 (deduction of payments); and 7701(a)(17) (defining "husband" and "wife"). I.R.C. § 71(a) defines three
types of alimony and separate maintenance payments which are includable in the recipient's gross income. Those are payments arising under (1) a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance; (2) a written separation agreement; or (3) a decree for support.
I.R.C. § 71(a) includes in the recipient's gross income periodic payments received "in
discharge of a legal obligation, which because of the marital or family relationship is
imposed on or incurred by" a payor under a written agreement. (Emphasis added.) Payments can be ."periodic" even though not made at regular intervals; a lump-sum amount
specified in the written agreement would not be includable in the recipient's income even
if paid in installments. Distinguishing periodic payments from installment payments is
not always easy, but § 71(c) provides guidelines. In general, payments continuing for
more than 10 years are considered periodic payments even if a lump-sum is specified in
the decree. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2). Prince v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1058 (1976) (property settlement payments over 121 months are alimony); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924
(1960) (language that 121 payments were part of property division was not controlling.
The payments were taxable to the recipient as income). I.R.C. § 215 excludes from the
gross income of the payor amounts includable in the income of the recipient.
Oral agreements do not qualify. Alexander v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 969
(1979) (fact that recipient included payments in income was irrelevant). Accord, Kievler
v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1042 (1969).
154. See Property Rights of a Same-Sex Couple, supra note 7, at 419 (citing Richardson v. Conley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978» (temporary
support awarded upon the dissolution of a lesbian household).
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contract. One provision might allow for the separate maintenance of one of the parties following the break up of the" living
unit. Unless these payments are viewed as equivalent to marital
alimony and separate maintenance payments, they will be subjected to double taxation: initially when earned by the obligor,
and again when paid over to the recipient.11111
Non-marital support payments can be treated the same as
marital alimony and separate maintenance payments without severely distorting statutory language or contravening congressional intent. The Revenue Act of 19421116 evinced a dual intent
regarding such support payments. Congress promulgated the Act
to (1) tax only the party beneficially receiving the income, and
(2) produce "uniformity" in the treatment of amounts paid in
the nature of or in lieu of alimony, regardless of variance in different states concerning the existence and continuance of an obligation to pay alimony.1117 The pertinent Code sectionsl118 treat
alimony and separate maintenance payments as income to the
wife and allow a corresponding deduction to the husband for
such amounts. When the flow of payments is reversed so that
the wife pays, "husband" means wife and "wife" means husband.1119 Thus, "wife" and "husband" are interchangeable terms,
serving only to identify the recipient and payor in order to avoid
double taxation. It is not so great a step to extend these provisions to putative spouses and, logically, to de facto spouses as
well.160
155. See I.R.C. § 6l.
156. Pub. L. No. 753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798 (amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, §
22, 53 Stat. 9 (now I.R.C. § 71».
157. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B.
372,427. Lack of a state support obligation is no bar. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 623 (1951) (treatment of payments is not determined by state law characterization); Harris v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 895 (1952) (payments taxed as alimony
even though Louisiana imposes no duty of support on a divorced husband).
158. See note 153 supra.
159. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17).
160. Although courts consistently hold that determination of the parties' marital
status is governed by the law of their domicile, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989
(1980), the characterization of a dissolution is not binding for federal tax purposes.
State characterizations notwithstanding, certain payments under a written agreement incident to an annulment of a void or voidable marriage (like those under divorce
or separation) may be deductible by the payor and includable in gross income by the
recipient. Reisman v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 570 (1968), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3. See also
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935
(1966) (payments were deductible by payor and income to recipient even though divorce
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For example, Newburger v. Commissioner I6I illustrates the
Tax Court's flexible interpretation of the Revenue Act of 1942.
Newburger's wife sued for separation. He counterclaimed and
obtained an annulment based on the invalidity of the wife's earlier ex parte divorce. I62 The court ordered him to pay $150 per
week support. I6S The IRS argued the payments were not deductible because Newburger had no legal obligation under New York
law, but the Tax Court held the putative marriage created a legal obligation and allowed him the deduction. I64
The deductibility of payments is a relief measure which-by
taxing only the party who beneficially receives the income-encourages obligors to make support payments. It applies
to those payments made because of the "family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation to support
which is made specific by the decree, instrument or agreement."I615 Because of increasing societal and judicial acceptance
of de facto families, the "general obligation to support" should
be predicated on the mutual expectations and needs of the parties. I66 Newburger is an important step toward recognizing de
facto family life and is consistent with the express congressional
intent to treat spousal support payments uniformly.167
Temporary support or rehabilitation payments received by
one of the partners following dissolution of a de facto family are
probably income in any event. I68 The IRS will likely take the
position that court ordered payments incident to the dissolution
of a de facto family are the discharge of a contractual obligation,
hence a nondeductible personal expense to the obligor. I69 Failure
of the courts to extend Newburger will, therefore, result in the
was invalid in New York). But see Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (IRS will not follow
these Second Circuit decisions). Compare Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1974) (rejecting Borax) with Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974) (following Borax).
161. 61 T.C. 457 (1974).

162.ld.
163. ld. at 458.
164. ld. at 460.
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957).
See notes 1-4 supra.
See note 157 supra.
See 1.R.C. § 61.
See Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974). I.R.C. § 262 makes personal expenses nondeductible.

166.
167.
168.
169.
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inequity of double taxation.
B.

PROPERTY DIVISIONS

Marital dissolution actions commonly provide for the division of property. A property settlement is not income to the recipient because courts find an implied agreement that the marital rights surrendered equal the amount received,I'1O and such a
settlement is generally not subject to gift tax.l'11
De facto family property settlements do not fall squarely
within any statutory provision. They must be analyzed under
the general rules governing transfers of property. Severance of
joint tenancy property does not result in gain or loss for income
tax purposes and the partition of jointly owned property according to contributions does not create a taxable gift.l'12 When property held in one name is partitioned disproportionately upon the
dissolution of a de facto family, the tax consequences may depend upon the cause of action vindicated, although state characterizations of the form of recovery are not necessarily binding
for federal tax purposes.1'18
170. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The Davis Court assumed the parties negotiated at arm's length and judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the
property for which they were exchanged. Because there are generally no income tax consequences to the recipient of a property distribution incident to a divorce, does not
necessarily mean there are none to the transferor. See note 188 infra and accompanying
text.
171. I.R.C. § 2516 (transfer of property or interests in property made under a qualified written agreement in settlement of marital or property rights is considered to be
made for full and adequate compensation). But see Rev. RuI. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414
(distinguishing settlement of support rights from inheritance rights). A transfer to satisfy
the support obligation which normally lasts as long as both spouses live, or until the
recipient remarries, does not diminish the transferor's estate any more than any other
personal obligation. But a settlement of inheritance rights is a present transfer of what
would otherwise be a major portion of the payor's estate on death. Consequently, a
transfer of property under a divorce decree is a gift to the extent the value of the property exceeds the value of the support rights surrendered. Id. See also R. STEPHENS, G.
MAxFIELD & A. LIND, supra note 94, at 1110.02[5] [a] (discussing the difficulties of valuing
support rights).
172. It must first be determined whether the creation of the joint tenancy involved a
completed gift. If not, each party must withdraw her respective contribution plus the net
income attributable to it, or a taxable gift occurs. See Stinehart, Tax Implications of the
Forms of Spousal Co-ownership, 6 COMM. PROP. J. 25, 41 (1979).
173. Bruch, supra note 7, at 129.
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Gift Tax
An unmarried cohabitant may be granted relief under a variety of equitable theories,17. the resulting trust,t'115 constructive
trust,1'16 or implied domestic partnership.1'1'1 These remedies focus on real or imagined economic contributions to property and
can result in gift tax liability to the extent the recipient's recovery exceeds consideration given.1'18 Here, the absence of a marital relationship may prove advantageous to the unmarried
couple-at least to the extent the property distribution is courtordered. Not all exchanges lacking full consideration in money
174. See note 4 supra.
175. A resulting trust arises when a person makes or causes to be made a disposition
of property under circumstances which raise the inference that she does not intend the
person taking or holding the property to have the beneficial interest in the property,
where the inference is not rebutted, and the beneficial interest is not otherwise effectively disposed of. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 404 (1959). It may arise where
property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at her direction
the vendor transfers the property to another person. ld. §§ 440-460. A resulting trust is
appropriate where one partner contributed to the purchase price of property, but title
stands in the name of the other. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 189. Compare McDonald V. Carr,
150 m. 204, 37 N.E. 225 (1895) (resulting trust permitted for a non-family relationship of
20 years duration; one party purchased the land and placed title in cohabitant's name),
with Creasman V. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948) (trust recovery denied). In
Creasman, one party purchased property, made additions, and put it in cohabitant's
name. The court held that, absent evidence to the contrary, it was presumed the parties
disposed of the property as they intended because they deliberately made disposition
between themselves. But see In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864
(1972) (recovery allowed on other grounds). The court said: "Arguably, Creasman should
be over-ruled and its archaic presumption invalidated." ld. at 75, 499 P.2d at 867.
The resulting trust theory works best where both parties have incomes and contrib. ute their earnings to a common fund to purchase property. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 192.
The theory is inapplicable where one partner works at a salaried position and the other
is a homemaker. ld.
176. A constructive trust is a relationship concerning property subjecting the person
by whom title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
grounds that retention of the property is wrongful and would result in unjust enrichment. It arises not from intention but as an equitable remedy. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § l(e) (1959). Fraud is the essential element, but the inherent flexibility in the
doctrine makes it a useful last resort for de facto families without a remedy. Pfaff, supra
note 7, at 193.
177. Domestic partnership claims provide the best avenue in those courts which are
willing to view the relationship as an economic arrangement in which one party provides
capital, the other services. This claim still seems to require some type of business arrangement. E.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (implied
partnership found in the operation of cattle ranch). The better view finds the very existence of a non-marital relationship a joint economic venture. See generally Pfaff, supra
note 7, at 185-89.
178. See generally notes 22-23 supra.
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or money's worth are taxable gifts.179 TreasUry Regulations exclude sales, exchanges, and transfers of property "made in the
ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at
arm's length, and free from any donative intent) . . . ."lSO
Court-imposed property settlements probably qualify as exempt
exchanges. lsl The key is the involuntariness of the transfer. Absent an intention by the donor to circumvent the estate tax by
voluntarily depleting the estate, there is no reason to subject the
transaction to gift tax. 1S2
Income Tax

A more difficult situation arises when a money or property
division is' tailored to compensate the plaintiff for the value of
services rendered, or to restore the value of benefits received by
the defendant. Any amount received under a breach of contractlS3 or quantum meruitlSl claim has generally been includable in' gross income as compensation for services.
In Cotnam v. Commissioner,lSG for example, a woman quit
179. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).

180. [d.
181. The gift tax applies only to voluntary transfers. Harris v. Commissioner, 340
U.S. 106 (1950). In Harris, the Court explained:
This [divorce settlement] transaction is not "in the ordinary
course of business" in any conventional sense. . . . But if two
partners on dissolution of a firm entered into a transaction of
this character or if Chancery did it for them, there would seem
to be no doubt that the [settlement would be tax free] .•..
No reason is apparent why husband and wife should be under
a heavier handicap • • • •
[d. at 112.
182. See id. Accordingly, the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414, discussed in note 171 supra, does not apply, even if the de facto spouse's support rights are
valued at zero. That ruling distinguished settlement of marital support rights from settlement of inheritance rights and found gift tax liability in the latter. De facto spouses
have no inheritance rights. For income tax consequences to the de facto spouse whose
support and inheritance rights are valued at zero, see notes 189-191 infra and accompanying text.
183. Cohabitation alone does not give rise to rights in the property of the other
partner, but express agreements between the cohabitants are enforceable if illicit sex is
not the sole consideration. See generally materials cited note 7 supra. An implied agreement may lead only to a presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. York
v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 949, 544 P.2d 572, 574 (1975).
184. Quantum meruit is a legal action brought on an existing but unenforceable contract. It requires evidence of specific services and is subject to attack on the basis of
illegal consideration. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 187.
185. 28 T.C. 947 (1957), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
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her job and moved into a man's residence to "render services
and attention as an attendant or friend,"ls6 in exchange for onefifth his estate. The man died intestate in 1945 but Cotnam received judgment for $120,000, less attorney's fees of $50,366.
The Tax Court classified the recovery as delayed compensation
for services rather than a tax-free bequest. The entire $120,000
was included in her income, spread over the four-and-a-half year
period during which it was "earned."IS'1 Cotnam was allowed a
deduction for attorney's fees, but only in the year in which they
were paid. Because the attorney's fees in the year paid far exceeded her other income for that year, much of the deduction
was useless.

Property Division
A final consideration is the income tax consequences of a
property division. Even the transfer of property in exchange for
the release of marital rights results in taxable gain to the payor
if the value of the property at the time of the transfer exceeds
the' transf~ror's basis in that property. ISS
The other side of the transaction concerns the recipient.
Neither marital nor de facto spouses have a financial basis in
their support rights, having paid nothing for them in the first
place. The difference between the value of property received and
the basis in the rights surrendered (zero) is logically all taxable
186. 263 F.2d at 120 n.1.
187. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and accepted Cotnam's position that
the attorney's fees were not includable in income. The court of appeals relied on an
Alabama statute which provided that an attorney has "the same right and power over
said suits, judgments and decrees, to enforce their liens as their clients had or may have
for the amount due thereon to them." ld. at 125 (citing ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 64 (1940».
Absent a specific statute like Alabama's, courts have consistently refused to follow
the Fifth Circuit, reaffirming the Tax Court holding in Cotnam and the general rule that
a lien is not a right or title in the recovery. Accordingly, the entire recovery is taxable
income to the litigant even though she never receives that portion which goes to the
attorney. E.g., Estate of Gadlow v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 975 (1968).
188. In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), a Delaware taxpayer, under a
property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree, transferred to his former wife appreciated shares of stock in return for the release of her marital rights. The
court found the transfer not a nontaxable division of property between co-owners but
rather a taxable transfer of property in satisfaction of a legal obligation. Accordingly, he
was taxed on the difference between his adjusted basis in the property and its fair market value on the date of transfer.
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gain. lS9 Even under community property rules, where a divorce
settlement is viewed as a division of property belonging to the
marital partnership, the use of any separate property to satisfy
the settlement gives rise to a taxable event.190
There is room here for improvement in the treatment of
both marital and de facto families. What is really being transferred in most property settlements is title, possession, and use
of tangible property the couple previously shared. It would be
more sensible to treat the dissolution property transfer as a nontaxable event, carry the old basis of the property over to the new
owner, and defer taxation until the new owner sells it. The
courts, however, have not accepted this view. 191
VII. ESTATE TAX

A.

MARITAL DEDUCTION; JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY

Except for the marital deduction and a different treatment
of joint tenancy property, estate tax laws treat married and unmarried households basically alike. The marital deduction is a
major benefit because it allows the greater of $250,000 or fifty
percent of the value of property passing to the surviving spouse
to be deducted from the decedent's gross estate.192
The survivorship feature of joint tenancy allows property to
pass to the surviving cotenant outside the decedent's estate and
free of claims by the decedent's creditors.19s Despite the popular
misconception, it does not exclude the value of the property for
189. See I.R.C. § 1001. The IRS bas ruled-without really explaining why-that a
wife in this situation bas no taxable gain. Rev. Rul. 67-221,1967-2 C.B. 63. The de facto
spouse is in a more tenuous position. The IRS ruling, however, leaves open the possibility that a future ruling will extend equivalent treatment to de facto spouses, even in the
absence of congressional action.
190. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350
(9th Cir. 1977). In the Carrieres' California divorce decree, community property was unevenly distributed. The husband was required to equalize the division by transferring
separate property. The Tax Court held that, to the eJ$nt separate property was used to
acquire a share of the wife's community property, there was a taxable sale on which the
wife's gain must be recognized.
191. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68-71 (1962).
192. I.R.C. § 2056. This is another form of equalization of treatment between community property and common law states. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra
note 94, at 11 5.06[1]. See also notes 6 and 32 supra.
193. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 615 (abr. ed. 1968).
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estate tax purposes.1 94 The entire value of jointly owned property (except to the extent that the surviving tenant contributed
to the cost of the acquisition of the property), including appreciation in value, is included in the estate of the first cotenant to
die. 191i The burden is on the survivors to prove their contributions if they hope to exclude them from the estate tax base.196 If
the decedent's interest was acquired gratuitously from another
co-owner, the value of that interest is not included in the
estate. 197

B.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

De facto families intent on preserving the property rights
and interests of survivors need to draft contracts capable of
withstanding a court test. 198 Contract claims require recitation
of consideration to support the contract. Thus, a cause of action
under breach of contract or quantum meruit is a claim for compensation for services performed, and any amount received is includable in income. 199 Framing the claim in testamentary language does not necessarily convert the recovery into a tax-free
legacy or bequest.2oo The issue of whether any amount is taxable
to the beneficiary generally arises when the recipient maintains
194. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11 4.12[4].
195. I.R.C. § 2040(a). R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11
4.12[4].
196. [d. at 11 4.12[7][a]. I.R.C. § 2040(c), added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2881, recognizes the value of services contributed by a
surviving spouse/joint owner of property, provided the property is used in a business or
farm in which he or she materially participated. Sugar, How New § 2040(c) Alters the
Estate Tax Burden on Jointly-Owned Property, 50 J. TAX. 270, 272 (1979). The value of
homemaker's contributions are excluded.
197. I.R.C. § 2040(a).
198. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7. Written contracts are more likely to survive
than oral contracts, which face Statute of Frauds challenges and evidentiary problems.
Services rendered furnish adequate consideration to support a contract, even if the services are minimal. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7.
199. See Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (amounts received were income because the property was promised to the taxpayer by the decedent
in exchange for services); Davies v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954) (Taxpayer could
not and did not rely on a mere promise of the decedent unsupported by any consideration, but in each count of her claim mentioned some valuable consideration moving from
her to him. The Tax Court included the settlement in income.). Rev. Rul. 67-375, 1967-2
C.B. 60 (distribution of property under the terms of a will in satisfaction of a written
agreement requiring the taxpayer to perform services for the testator is compensation for
services, and includable in gross income in the taxable year of receipt).
200. E.g., Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (federal tax
liability is based on the underlying nature and not the form of the claim).
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the recovery is a gift or bequest,201 while the estate argues the
amounts constitute settlement of a claim and, therefore, are deductible by the estate.202 Federal tax liability is based on the
underlying nature of the claim, not its form.203 The court must
determine the value of personal services rendered to the
decedent.
Gertrude Davies, for example, worked for a physician for
$25 per week from 1941 until her death in 1946.204 In addition,
she and her husband performed miscellaneous personal services
for the doctor. To retain her services, the physician orally promised to bequeath to her one-third of his estate so she would
"never have to work again."2015 He died intestate. She sued for
one-third of his $180,000 estate, and settled for $8,500. Davies
alleged that reasonable compensation for her services from 19411946 would have been $75 to $100 per week. The Tax Court held
the $8,500 settlement (when added to the $25 per week she had
formerly received) did not exceed reasonable compensation and
was, therefore, gross income.206
Even a close family relationship is not enough to exclude
the recovery from gross income where business related services
are rendered. In Cohen v. United States,207 the taxpayer agreed
to assist his ailing brother in operating a corporation. As an inducement, his brother promised to bequeath corporate stock to
him, but died without naming Cohen as a legatee. Cohen sued
for specific performance of the will contract. His entire recovery
was taxed as income. The district court explained that "love and
affection combined with the business aspects of the agreement,
did not change the ordinary contractual obligations which ensued . . . ."20S
201. I.R.C. § 102 excludes from income amounts received by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance.
202. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Davies v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954).
203. Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
204. Davies v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954).
205. ld. at 525.
206. The court found she "failed to show any part of the $8,500 was received as a
testamentary gift. •••n ld. The language of the court leaves open the possibility that,
had she recovered more than the reasonable value of the services, the excess would have
been treated as a tax-free bequest.
207. 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
208. ld. at 742.
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In First National Bank v. United States,209 a woman sought
to enforce an oral agreement to make a will in return for managing the decedent's household, assisting in the operation of the
ranch, and attending to his personal needs. She released her
claim in exchange for $65,000 and a ranch in Mexico. The government sought to prevent the reduction of the gross estate by
the contract claim, and argued that the woman failed to show
adequate consideration. The court disagreed, found adequate
consideration, and allowed the deduction to the estate.210 Obviously, the settlement was income to her.
The services rendered in all these cases are distinguishable
from those performed in the household. Because courts and the
IRS hold domestic services have no value in "money or money's
worth" as contributions to property acquisitions,211 consistency
requires the same services not be adjudged "valuable" when settling a claim against the estate. That consistency was lacking in
Hansen v. Commissioner,212 where the plaintiff received·
$150,000 in settlement of a claim for compensation for services
rendered from 1946-1964. The court made no attempt to value
the services. Because the taxpayer "was not an heir. . . and not
a legatee under an earlier will,"218 and because she alleged the
amount was for compensation, the $150,000 was includable in
income.214 Had she recovered instead under a trust or implied
domestic partnership theory,21G an argument that domestic services lack commercial value might have withstood the IRS challenge that the recovery was compensation for services, without
actually jeopardizing the claim itself. It would be unwise to forfeit a cause of action due to an inaccurately phrased claim, but
Hansen demonstrates that effective tax planning begins with the
drafting of the complaint.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is commonly said that federal tax liability is based on the
209. 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1970).
210. Id. at 1388.
211. I.R.C. §§ 2043(a) (estate tax); 2512(b)(gift tax).
212. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 43 (1974).
213. Id. at 45.
214.Id.
215. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7.
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underlying nature of the claim, not its form. It is apparent, however, that many of the tax provisions governing the economics of
de facto family life were developed in a commercial context. De
facto families are on the rise,216 and tax policies favoring ceremonial marriage are anachronistic. Courts will increasingly face
tax questions concerning de facto families. 217 In order to further
the general tax policy of equivalent treatment of taxpayers in
similar situations, courts will be called upon to evaluate the family nature of a household. Some suggested factors to consider
are:
(1) intermingling of funds;

(2) sharing of expenses;
(3) shared use of personal property;
(4) shared use of housing (as opposed to clearly segregated
rooms or living areas);
(5) dependency of one or more household members on another for support;
(6) duration of the living arrangement;
(7) extent of gift giving within the household;
(8) moral obligation to care for another person; and
(9) intent of the parties.

The presence of a significant number of these factors indicates
that the household constitutes a de facto family. The presence of
a clear profit motive (receiving rental income, for example)
would help distinguish the more loosely structured roommate or
non-family situation where incomes, expenses, and assets are
clearly segregated. The factual determination required is no
more difficult than that which the courts customarily engage in
whenever an agreement is implied or an equitable solution imposed. Certainly the analysis will be easiest where it will also be
most prevalent-in the case of couples. Unfortunately, parties
who enter non-marital living arrangements often do not know
their existing property rights and are unaware of the tax consequences of their decisions. Unless Congress rectifies the present
tax inequities, parties to a self-defined relationship will require
effective tax counseling if they are to mjnjmize their disproportionate tax burden.
216. See note 2 supra.
217. See note 4 supra.
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